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110 abstract
This paper explains the main characteristics of and prerequisites for coordination 
between the measures and instruments of monetary and public debt management 
policies in Croatia and evaluates current practice, particularly over the last two 
recession years. Attention is drawn to the importance of coordination for achie-
ving macroeconomic stability and to the main problems and challenges obstruc-
ting successful coordination. It is assessed that the Croatian National Bank (CNB), 
with its measures and instruments, has consistently contributed to improving 
coordination with the public debt management policy, despite the narrowing of its 
room for manoeuvre due to a complex economic environment and the specific 
functioning of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Notwithstanding 
some contribution to coordination made by the Government and Ministry of Fi-
nance, they must take measures and employ instruments to make more significant 
adjustments and, together with the CNB, define an optimum fiscal and monetary 
policy mix for the future that will ensure stable economic growth. This paper gives 
an overview of major CNB measures aimed at facilitating the public debt mana-
gement and improving coordination with the Ministry of Finance, and presents a 
detailed analysis of open market operations. It also points to a certain contribu-
tion of the Ministry of Finance to the coordination improvement, indicating major 
barriers to effective coordination between these important policies. 
Keywords: monetary policy, public debt management policy, government securi-
ties market, open market operations, Croatia 
1 introduction
The paper deals with the coordination between the monetary and public debt mana-
gement policies over the last ten years, with special emphasis on the last two reces-
sion years. It analyses certain aspects of this coordination, assesses the coordination 
level achieved so far and offers some recommendations for its improvement.
The second part gives an account of some research works about the interdepen-
dence between the monetary, fiscal and public debt management policies, points 
to the importance of such coordination for macroeconomic stability, and outlines 
the main prerequisites for successful coordination. In this context, the compliance 
with these prerequisites in Croatia is assessed. 
The third part highlights some problems facing the monetary policy in Croatia, 
but also the contribution of the latter to coordination improvement. Emphasis is 
placed on the specific characteristics of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in Croatia, outlining the measures to facilitate public debt management in 
the country.
The fourth part analyses the public debt management policy in Croatia, with spe-
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111nance to coordination improvement and the importance of adopting a Public Debt 
Management Strategy (2011-13). The adoption of the Strategy should make the 
pubic debt management policy more transparent, but it is only through the realisa-
tion of the set goals that the coordination with the monetary policy will be signifi-
cantly improved.
Part five provides an analysis of coordination over the last ten years, reports on the 
progress made, but also shows the encountered obstacles to improving coordina-
tion between the monetary and public debt management policies, particularly over 
the last two recession years.
The conclusion presents recommendations for improving coordination between 
the monetary and public debt management policies. 
2  coordination between the monetary, fiscal and public 
debt management policies
The harmonisation between the monetary and fiscal policy objectives and instru-
ments represents a crucial link in the formulation and realisation of any economic 
policy concept, because it is the harmonisation of the objectives and instruments 
that the efficiency of any economic policy and its realisation depend on (Jurković, 
2002:197). Effective coordination requires the exchange of information between 
all subjects involved in decision-making.
In many countries, poor fiscal policy-making has been the main cause of nume-
rous problems (high inflation and budget deficit, low economic growth). In order 
to recover, these countries need the appropriate fiscal adjustments. These difficul-
ties are particularly pronounced in countries, which allow government financing 
from the central bank’s primary issue. Therefore, it is desirable that the govern-
ment should take out loans exclusively on the market under the same terms as all 
other sectors. However, excessive government borrowing from banks frequently 
ends up in general monetary expansion, which can only be halted by the appro-
priate fiscal adjustments. In the absence of such adjustments and the appropriate 
monetary policy measures against monetary expansion, the greatest damage will 
be inflicted on the private sector, by crowding it out from the credit market. Mo-
reover, economic growth may slow down, as the final consequence of poor fiscal 
policy implementation.
A poorly conducted monetary policy can also obstruct the implementation of a 
successful and efficient fiscal policy, particularly as concerns debt management. 
An over-restrictive monetary policy, aimed, for example, at maintaining a certain 
exchange rate level, may (especially in the short run) lead to a surge in interest 
rates, thus increasing the public debt servicing costs and threatening fiscal stabi-
lity (IMF and World Bank, 2003). Monetary policy should primarily take account 
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112 commendable to take too restrictive measures, which might have adverse econo-
mic effects.
2.1 literature overview
It is very difficult to briefly demonstrate all aspects of interdependence between 
monetary and fiscal policies and the debt management policy (as a key segment of 
fiscal policy). Therefore, only some of these aspects will be shown below.
The interdependence between monetary, fiscal and public debt management poli-
cies is best explained by the influence of budget deficit and public debt on interest 
rates. There are completely opposite views on this relationship in the literature: 
according to some of them, growing budget deficit and public debt are the main 
causes of macroeconomic instability, while according to others, the influence of 
these factors on other relevant economic variables is negligible. Evans (1985) and 
Barro (1997), for example, argue that budget deficit and public debt do not have 
any significant impact on either the nominal or real interest rates. Similarly, Boothe 
and Reid (1989) conclude that there is no significant positive correlation between 
fiscal deficit and interest rates. Barro (1997) suggests that the growth of public 
spending, regardless of whether it is financed through tax increases or public debt, 
will not affect other economic variables (aggregate demand or interest rates), be-
cause it will be offset by growing private savings1. Such a view that taxpayers 
behave completely rationally seems to be quite unrealistic and has been perma-
nently challenged. Thus, Ford and Laxton (1995), analysing the budget deficit 
movements in nine OECD countries with liberalised capital markets, conclude 
that the public debt growth in any of these countries influences the interest rate 
growth in the other countries, showing that a high public debt in a country can lead 
to considerable negative externalities. In addition, Woodford (1996) deems that 
public debt growth can lead to severe macroeconomic instability that cannot even 
be solved by taking the appropriate monetary policy measures. Tanzi and Fanizza 
(1995), using data for 18 industrially advanced countries for the period 1970-
1994, conclude that the public debt growth, being the consequence of fiscal deficit 
accumulation during that long period, spurred the increase in global interest rates 
by more than 1.5 percentage points. Their empirical evidence supports the theory 
of crowding out investments, which suggests that the growth in public debt leads 
to interest rate growth and consequently to a decline in total investments.
Many research works highlight the importance of the debt structure for a short-
term and long-term implementation of optimal fiscal and monetary policies (Co-
simano and Gapen, 2003). It was the structure of debt, and not its level, that was 
the main cause of financial crises and general macroeconomic instability in many 
transition countries (Mihaljek, 2002). What would be the desirable debt structure 
to guarantee the smooth economic development of a country? The answer to this 
question is difficult, and it largely depends on the direction and intensity of corre-
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113lation between inflation, real economic growth and interest rate (Missale, 2000). 
Missale concludes that, in order to be in line with the monetary policy, which has 
as its main objective the maintenance of price stability, the optimal debt structure 
would be a mix of a long-term fixed interest rate debt and an inflation-indexed 
debt. Such a debt mix would have a favourable impact on deficit stabilisation, 
which Missale believes to be the main objective of debt management.
The main aspect of the debt structure is the maturity, which proved to be the key 
debt management parameter, both in theory and in practice. Many authors claim 
that, by having a large share of short-term debt instruments in total public debt, the 
government takes on a higher risk of interest rate shocks and debt renewal risk, 
which can also undermine restrictive efforts of the monetary policy (Missale, Gia-
vazzi and Benigno, 1997). Wolswijk and de Haan (2005) argue that EU member 
states are increasingly oriented to the long-term fixed interest rate debt, while the 
shares of a short-term debt and a long-term variable interest rate debt (which en-
tails a high risk of interest rate shocks) have decreased. Therefore, it is necessary, 
especially during the fiscal stabilisation process, to increase the share of long-term 
fixed rate debt in the domestic currency. This would increase the credibility of the 
entire stabilisation programme and attract more investors in government securi-
ties. However, an increase in the share of long-term debt, despite the lower re-
newal risk, results in higher interest expenses, so that it is vital to come to a reaso-
nable compromise between the renewal risk and the debt servicing costs.
Debt structure can be analysed according to both the creditor’s residence and the 
currency in which the government is obliged to repay the debt. Excessive reliance 
on foreign borrowing increases the sensitivity of a country to abrupt changes in 
market conditions and to “mood swings” of foreign investors2. However, the cre-
ditor’s residence has lately become less relevant, because, due to the overall 
market liberalisation and globalisation, greater importance has been attached to 
the characteristics of debt instruments and debt distribution channels (Wolswijk 
and de Haan, 2005). The share of external debt in total public debt should not be 
too large, in order to prevent the adverse effects of this public share of foreign debt 
on the country’s external indebtedness.
The general stability also depends on the debt structure according to the forms 
(instruments) of public debt. In some countries, e.g. Brazil, instability was mainly 
caused by bad debt structure according to the types of debt instruments. Excessive 
reliance on instruments with variable interest rates and on inflation-indexed or 
exchange rate-indexed instruments may considerably increase the exchange rate 
and interest rate risks (Mihaljek, 2002). Some authors believe the economies with 
larger shares of nominal debt to be much sounder than those with larger shares of 
indexed debt, as the nominal debt protects the state budget from unexpected 
2 In 2001, foreign investors accounted for about 60% of public debt in Argentina, which was one of the main 
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114 shocks by providing a non-distortive source or revenue and ensuring an easier and 
more efficient fiscal and monetary policy implementation (Cosimano and Gapen, 
2003). On the other hand, careful debt maturity planning and debt instrument in-
dexing may have a beneficial effect on the credibility of an anti-inflationary mo-
netary policy and, consequently, on attracting investors and increasing their inve-
stments in such instruments. The key advantage of inflation-indexed bonds consi-
sts in the fact that they are normally issued at a lower interest rate, which does not 
incorporate inflationary expectations (Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005).
Blanchard and Favero (2004) argue that a huge public debt, increasing the coun-
try’s credit risk, can cause serious imbalance, due to which a restrictive monetary 
policy can produce unusual effects. More specifically, in countries with large and 
mainly short-term public debt, the growth of interest rates aimed at curbing infla-
tion, increases the debt servicing costs and, consequently, the level of debt. This 
then leads to an increase in credit risk, higher capital outflows and, possibly, 
exchange rate depreciation. Additionally, if most of the debt is denominated in or 
pegged to a foreign currency, the exchange rate depreciation can lead to further 
debt growth.
Accordingly, most of the above-mentioned studies point to the connection and 
interdependence between monetary, fiscal and public debt management policies, 
and a need for their coordination, with the final purpose of achieving macroecono-
mic stability.
2.2 coordination and macroeconomic stability
The importance of coordination is illustrated by the following table:
table 1
Budget constraints and policy coordination
Fiscal policy Debt management Monetary policy
Dt  =  (Bt - Bt-1)  +  (Mt-Mt-1) (1)
Source: Sundararajan, Dattels and Blommestein (1997).
Table 1 shows the necessity of coordination, due to the interconnection between 
the key components of fiscal policy (the size of the budget deficit), debt manage-
ment (public debt issue) and monetary policy (the money supply growth rate). 
According to expression (1), budget deficit in a current period must be financed by 
taking out loans or through net the sales of bonds (Bt-Bt-1) to banks, companies and 
individuals, or by the central bank’s credit to the government, which in turn results 
in the growth of money supply (Mt-Mt-1). This equation is as simplification of 
reality, as in most countries money supply is not created exclusively through the 
central bank’s credit to the government (in Croatia, this mode of creating M1 is 
not used at all). However, this model provides a basis for understanding the inter-
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115Debt management is a process of assessing and analysing the amount and structure 
of debt, with a view to reducing the underlying risks, given their direct influence 
on the state budget, financial system and capital market and, consequently, on fi-
scal and macroeconomic stability (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Hence, the fiscal 
and public debt management policies strongly affect monetary policy, which is 
why all these policies have to be coordinated in order to ensure macroeconomic 
stability. 
Croatia’s deficit and public debt have been on the increase in recent years, and the 
government has increasingly borrowed on both domestic and foreign markets, 
which necessarily reflected on the financial system liquidity. The CNB has respon-
ded to this on several occasions (e.g. by reducing the reserve requirement rate), in 
order to prevent the crowding out of other sectors. However, the crowding out of 
other sectors is not only the consequence of temporary liquidity shortages, but 
also of the growth in bad corporate and household loans. The share of bad loans in 
banks’ portfolios went up from 5% in 2008 to 10% at end-2010, which made the 
banks more prone to extend loans to the government as the most reliable debtor. 
Borrowing on international markets (by both government and private sectors) af-
fects the monetary situation in the country, because it results in large foreign cur-
rency inflows and strong appreciation pressures on the domestic currency. Then 
the CNB must intervene on the foreign exchange market and purchase large 
amounts of foreign currency, which accelerated the growth of reserve money 
(M0), especially during 2006 and 2007. The CNB has repeatedly warned of the 
huge external debt growth, so that the government reduced the foreign component 
of public debt from about 45% in early 2006 to about 30% in late 2008, while the 
private sector continued to borrow heavily from abroad. A decline in the govern-
ment’s external borrowing led to a fall in overall public debt, but only until mid-
2008, when public debt rocketed again.
Due to a sharp increase in money supply (M1) during 2006 and 2007, coupled 
with the growth of energy and food prices, inflation reached 6% in 2008. In order 
to stop that growth, the CNB had to tighten its monetary policy, but this was not 
enough to stop the bank credit activity. From the end of 2008, the CNB rejected 
more and more offers at reverse repo auctions, until they were finally stopped at 
the end of 2009, to be continued as soon as any substantial economic recovery is 
observed and the CNB assesses that additional liquidity can be regularly injected 
into the system, without the risk of escalating inflation.
Due to a sharp decline in economic activity and, consequently, in the national 
budget revenue, budget deficit increased, forcing the government to take out in-
creasingly large loans. Given the excessive level of external debt, the government 
borrowed on the domestic market, which, due to a relatively strict monetary policy, 
causing a fall in M1, led to interest rate fluctuations. This additionally aggravated 
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116 order to facilitate the government’s borrowing on the crisis-stricken domestic fi-
nancial market and stabilise interest rates3, the CNB reduced the reserve require-
ment rate on two occasions (in 2008 and 2010), from 17% to 13%, releasing liqui-
dity worth over 11 billion kuna in total, and facilitating the government’s bor-
rowing without the crowding out of other sectors.
By combining foreign exchange interventions (the purchase and sale of foreign 
currency) and the reserve requirement rate cuts, the CNB tried to ensure the mo-
ney supply (M1), necessary to provide sufficient liquidity, while maintaining price 
stability. Thanks to the measures taken, M1 moved within the range between 47 
billion kuna and 49 billion kuna from February 2009 to the end of 2010. These 
movements seem logical, given the economic activity weakening (GDP dropped 
by 6% in 2009 and by 1.2% in 2010), and it will not change until fiscal consolida-
tion is achieved and signs of a significant economic recovery are observed. The 
key problem lies in the fact that the government, and not the economy, absorbed a 
large portion of liquidity released during the last two years, and spent it on the 
debt repayment and current consumption. Neither the private sector has made any 
significant use of credit facilities offered by the CBRD, so that the bulk of the 
earmarked funds remained unused. All this has narrowed the room for manoeuvre 
of the monetary policy, which has often been criticised for not having provided 
enough incentive to economic growth. However, it obviously had little room to do 
so without jeopardising its main function, which is to maintain price stability. 
Perhaps some monetary policy measures might have been more successful, had 
they been taken earlier (e.g. reducing the reserve requirement rate as early as the 
beginning or middle of 2008, when the first signs emerged of the financial crisis). 
However, one cannot be sure about that, because as inflation has soared ever since 
the end of 2007, taking this measure earlier would perhaps have led to its further 
escalation.
Given the complexity of the economic situation in recent years, the monetary, fi-
scal and public debt management policy measures should have been coordinated 
on an almost daily basis. The strongest contribution by the fiscal and public debt 
management policies to long-term macroeconomic stability and coordination with 
the monetary policy would be to reduce government spending, to the state budget 
balance and gradually harmonize the public debt growth rates with GDP growth 
rates. Then the public debt management policy could be more effectively harmo-
nized with the monetary policy, and government borrowing would be planned, 
rather than uncontrolled, and would be undertaken in periods of lower interest 
rates and higher liquidity. In such a way, the economy would be protected against 
liquidity shortages and interest rate fluctuations caused by increased government 
participation in the credit market.
3 In February 2009, overnight interbank interest rate on loans stood at 18.97%, and it has not exceeded 6.58% 
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117figure 1

















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
  Real annual GDP growth rate – left       Average annual inflation rate – left
 External debt (as a % of GDP) – right   Public debt (as a % of GDP) – right
*Public debt does not include government guarantees. As of 2008, the debt of the Croatian 
Motorway Company (HAC) has been excluded from the general government debt. Including these 
components, public debt climbs to almost 60% of GDP.
Sources: CNB and Ministry of Finance.
As shown by figure 1, the indicators remained stable in the period 2005-07, as 
these two politics contributed more substantially to coordination improvement. 
However, since 2008 (and some of them even since end-2007), the indicators have 
moved in a negative direction, which was due to both the global economic crisis 
and poor coordination between the fiscal, monetary and public debt management 
policies. The strongest inflation growth coincided with the public debt accelera-
tion (reflecting the interdependence between the monetary and public debt mana-
gement policies), and these two parameters were recently strongly influenced by 
the government, which failed to implement radical reforms and austerity measu-
res, thus making the largest possible contribution to coordination. 
It would be too simple to think that closer coordination between the monetary, fi-
scal and public debt management policies would immediately turn all these indi-
cators in a positive direction, but the situation would certainly improve if the po-
licy instruments and measures were harmonised.
Despite signs of economic recovery, observed during 2010 as a result of both the 
CNB’s policy of high domestic banking system liquidity aimed at stimulating 
banks’ credit activity, and some business projects launched by the Government, a 
major economic recovery and long-term macroeconomic stability are difficult to 
achieve without more substantial fiscal consolidation, which would strengthen the 
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118 2.3 prerequisites for good coordination
The main prerequisites for good coordination are the following: (1) a well-deve-
loped government securities market; (2) central bank independence; and (3) tran-
sparency of public debt management.
The efficiency of coordination in any country depends on the possibility to meet 
these prerequisites. The following analysis briefly explains the importance of each 
of them and evaluates compliance with these prerequisites in Croatia.
a well-developed government securities market facilitates the achievement of 
the objectives of monetary and public debt management policies, by increasing 
the transparency and predictability of the public debt management policy, and 
consequently, facilitating the monetary policy implementation. The multiple cor-
relation between the government securities market and the achievement of the 
objectives of monetary and public debt management policies is as follows:
–  Persons in charge of debt management, acting as government’s fund-raising 
agents, are interested in good operation and efficiency of the government se-
curities market, with the aim of minimising debt servicing costs.
–  As the monetary policy authority, the central bank promotes efficient determi-
nation of interest rates as one of the key components of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. As the central bank often intervenes on the 
government securities market, the good functioning of that market is impor-
tant for achieving monetary policy objectives.
–  Monetary, fiscal and other regulatory authorities are jointly interested in the 
development of an efficient government securities market, with the aim of 
maintaining macroeconomic stability (Dattels, 1995).
The development of an efficient government securities market is in the interest of 
both private and public sectors, and such market is considered as public good to 
be used by all taxpayers, because it ensures lower debt servicing costs. It is also 
useful to the financial sector as a whole, as it promotes safe and efficient saving 
and investment.
In underdeveloped economies, there is a need for concrete solutions for coordina-
tion and a formally prescribed obligation to exchange information between fiscal 
and monetary authorities. Given the underdevelopment of Croatia’s government 
securities market, formal regulations on coordination are still needed. Implicit 
coordination exists in countries with advanced financial markets and is carried out 
through the government securities markets. In such countries, formal coordination 
regulations are unnecessary, because coordination is a spontaneous process, taking 
place within the operations on the government securities market.
Croatia’s financial structure is still inadequate, with the predominant role of banks 
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119of financial instruments. However, thanks to the launching of open-market opera-
tions in mid-2005, the government securities market saw a revival and liquidity 
improved. A well-developed government securities market is based on an adequate 
market structure. However, market structures have changed increasingly over the 
last decade, so, instead of the auction-agency markets, dealer markets are more 
common in practice. This should be the right path for Croatia as well, because, 
according to the experience of many comparable countries4, the primary dealer 
system stimulates the development of government securities markets and enables 
considerable savings in public debt management.
The first prerequisite for good coordination has not yet been met, and there is still 
need for formal coordination regulations and a joint action between the CNB and 
Ministry of Finance towards further development of the government securities 
market.
central bank independence. The primary objective of the monetary policy in 
most countries, including Croatia, is to maintain price stability as a basis for achie-
ving economic growth, increasing employment and improving the living standards 
of citizens5. The strongest incentive to separate the debt management policy from 
the monetary policy is provided in the Maastricht Treaty, which prohibits govern-
ment borrowing from the central bank. Nevertheless, central banks and their mo-
netary policies are still facing political pressures, and the ECB itself has frequen-
tly been a target of criticism from the EU member state governments for its inte-
rest rate policy and the strong euro6.
Although the above discussion may suggest that the requirement for central bank 
independence has no connection whatsoever with the public debt management 
policy and the need to coordinate with that policy, the situation is different. The 
need for independence never excludes the possibility for a central bank to perform 
functions related to public debt management. On the contrary, the functions of 
central banks in developed countries do include a certain responsibility for public 
debt management. Of course, this responsibility must not be contrary to a central 
bank’s main objective, which is the maintenance of price stability. The responsi-
bility includes, at the minimum:
–  an advisory function – the central bank informs the finance ministry on the 
banking system liquidity, and movements in interest rates and monetary and 
credit aggregates. This information is critical for taking decisions on the man-
ner of deficit financing and for achieving the monetary policy objectives;
–  an issuing agency function – in many countries, central banks hold govern-
ment securities auctions, organize the open-market operations, involving go-
4 For example, Slovenia and Czech Republic have implemented the primary dealer model for many years now 
and they consider it as “extremely beneficial” for the development of government securities markets.
5 This monetary policy objective is mentioned in chapter 2, article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty.
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120 vernment securities used as collateral, and operate the settlement and payment 
systems;
–  a fiscal agency function – the central bank makes payments and collections on 
behalf of the state, thus acting as state treasurer7.
The CNB can also perform these functions and they do not affect its independence. 
Occasional attempts to compromise this independence do exist, but they should 
not be taken too seriously as they happen in many other, more advanced econo-
mies as well. The CNB’s independent monetary policy relies on a sound legal 
framework, but this independence does not mean that the bank is isolated or self-
sufficient, because it can only accomplish its goals in cooperation with others. 
Only independent institutions can achieve good coordination, without threatening 
their core functions. The Act on the CNB clearly regulates the cooperation with 
the fiscal policy regarding domestic and foreign borrowing, but it does not regulate 
the manner of financing this borrowing, so that occasional pressures in this direc-
tion are without merit. Hence, it can be freely said that the “central bank indepen-
dence” prerequisite is fully met in Croatia.
transparency of public debt management. The transparency of and clear rules 
for the operations of the central bank and finance ministry are very helpful in resol-
ving conflicts between monetary and public debt management policies, reducing 
the risk for investors and their transaction costs and, in the long run, they help the 
government bring down the debt servicing costs (IMF and World Bank, 2003).
The public debt management objectives should be clear and publicly known, with 
all methods of risk and cost measurement being fully explained. It is very impor-
tant that the public should have permanent access to all the information on budget 
activities, including the manner of their financing. The Government should regu-
larly disclose information on the currency and interest rate structures of debt and 
financial assets, as well as on their maturity structures. It is also crucial that infor-
mation is provided on all government contingent liabilities and on the tax treat-
ment of government bonds when they are first issued.
Until the beginning of 2011, the transparency of public debt management in Croa-
tia was rather poor, due to a lack of any comprehensive public debt management 
strategy. However, a Public Debt Management Strategy for the following three 
years was adopted in 2006, including a Government Securities Issuance Calendar 
for 2007, but most of the goals from the Strategy have never been realised. Fur-
thermore, the Strategy offered no appropriate models for risk management, which 
were crucial for reducing the debt management costs. Here we can draw on the 
example of Ireland, whose strategy includes efficient risk management, so that the 
Irish Risk Management Agency monitors interest rate movements on the financial 
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121markets and takes out loans only when interest rates are favourable. It often refi-
nances the debt issued at higher interest rate by borrowing at a lower rate8. One of 
the major goals of the 2006 Strategy was to introduce a primary dealer system, but 
this never came true.
In February 2011, the Government adopted a Public Debt Management Strategy 
for the period 2011-13, which was a major step towards a more transparent fiscal 
policy. Especially commendable is the following:
–  publishing of a T-bill auction calendar, showing the Government’s commit-
ment to strictly control and plan the short-term debt movements; 
–  extension of the average debt maturity and reduction of the share of short-term 
debt from 16.1% to 12-14%;
–  introduction of a currency risk hedging mechanism, converting a portion of 
the government debt in dollars (about 13% of total debt) into the debt in euro, 
in order to mitigate the risk of major fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate; 
and
–  orientation towards the continued development and improvement of the do-
mestic government securities market.
However, it is not clear why the Strategy ignores the issue of introducing the pri-
mary dealer system, and why the introduction of government bond issue auctions 
has been given up. Will the goals set in the Strategy be realised and at what pace? 
Will the public be adequately informed? Unfortunately, the answers to these que-
stions have not been presented to the public so far, but it remains to be hoped that 
this will become practice in the future.
The transparency of Croatia’s public debt management has increased, but there is still 
the problem of late delivery of data to the Croatian National Bank on all planned 
transactions related to domestic and external borrowing of the Ministry of Finance.
3 the influence of monetary policy on coordination
As in most European countries, the main objective of monetary policy in Croatia 
is to maintain price stability. This should be particularly emphasized, because mo-
netary policy has often been perceived by the public as having a crucial role in the 
promotion of exports, production and employment growth and, consequently, the 
growth of economy in general. The monetary policy indirectly affects all these 
variables, but the influence of other economic policymakers is even stronger, pri-
marily that of the Government. However, monetary policy can support the Gover-
nment in pursuing these goals, as long as the main objective of economic policy is 
not threatened.
8 Thanks to such management, the realised debt servicing costs in 2004 were lower by 350 million euro than 
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122 There are many monetary policy instruments for regulating banks’ credit activity 
and liquidity, as well as the quantity of money supply, with a view to maintaining 
price and exchange rate stability (which is of the utmost importance in such a highly 
eurized financial system). This article only deals with the most frequently used in-
struments, i.e. foreign exchange interventions (purchase and sale of foreign curre-
ncy), open market operations (OMO) and reserve requirement. Foreign exchange 
interventions have been particularly important over the last ten years, which saw 
strong appreciation pressures on the domestic currency due to the huge external 
debt. A restrictive measure of increasing the marginal reserve requirement rate from 
40% to 55% was introduced as late as end-2005, with a view to offsetting (to at least 
some extent) the negative effects of a boost in external debt. From end-2005 to the 
beginning of 2008, the CNB intervened 17 times on the foreign exchange market, 
purchasing about 2 billion euro. As a result, the amount of about 15 billion kuna was 
injected into the financial system, and money supply rose by almost 40%. Due to a 
sharp increase in monetary aggregates during 2006 and 2007, and the ever- growing 
energy and food prices, inflation reached 6% in mid-2008. In order to restrain that 
growth, the CNB had to tighten its monetary policy measures, but not enough to 
stop the credit activity of banks (credit growth decreased only slightly, from 15% in 
2007 to 11% in 2008). Inflationary pressures during 2008 led to increasingly strong 
demand for foreign currency and, consequently, to the depreciation of the kuna. In 
response to this, the CNB intervened three times from 2008 to 2009, by selling fo-
reign currency, which resulted in an outflow from the financial system worth almost 
6 billion kuna (in only 4 months, money supply fell from about 53 billion kuna to 
about 47 billion kuna), and a decline in inflation rate to below 3%.
The cessation of regular OMO, introduced for the purpose of improving the liquidity 
of the system, can also be considered as a restrictive measure. The last reverse repo 
auction was held in October 2009, when it was assessed that, given the economic 
downturn, there was enough liquidity in the system and that the auctions would be 
continued as soon as there were signs of any significant economic recovery.
The reserve requirement is an administrative and direct monetary policy instrument 
used for efficient regulation of the money supply, which is less and less often used on 
developed financial markets. Therefore, the CNB’s long-term goal is to gradually 
decrease the reserve requirement rate, which declined from 20% to 13% over the last 
ten years, resulting in a marked improvement in the financial system liquidity. 
3.1 transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is the impact of monetary policy 
on real movements in, e.g. investments, national income and prices. The mechanism 
works through a number of transmission channels (interest rates, exchange rate, 
credit), which have different significance across countries, depending on the spe-
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 Long-term kuna loans not indexed to foreign currency 
 Long-term kuna loans indexed to foreign currency 
 Long-term kuna deposits not indexed to foreing currency  
 Long-term kuna deposits indexed to foreign currency 














































in Croatia, as well, and it is exactly these specificities that reduce the effects of 
some monetary policy measures.
Žigman and Lovrinčević (2005) conclude that an underdeveloped financial market 
and a high level of eurisation9 represent the major barriers to an objective analysis 
of the functioning of individual transmission channels, which strongly impedes 
conducting an independent monetary policy. They also hamper coordination with 
the fiscal and public debt management policies, because the CNB’s measures do 
not always have desirable effects. For example, by applying its measures, the 
CNB deeply influences movements in interest rates on the money market, but its 
influence on interest rates on bank deposits and loans is much weaker, because 
these rates depend on external inflows of funds from foreign owners of domestic 
banks. Therefore, the CNB is exclusively focused on controlling the amount of 
money, as the possibility to control its price (interest rate) is much smaller. A more 
perceptible strengthening of the interest rate channel can only be expected once 
Croatia joins the European Monetary Union.
figure 2
Selected interest rates, 2000-10 (%)
Source: CNB.
9 The level of eurisation of the Croatia’s financial market is 80% (measured by the share of foreign currency 
savings in total savings). The reasons for such high foreign currency participation are mainly historical and 
are very complex. During the last ten years, the CNB took a series of measures to reduce the level of euri-
sation to about 65%, but, as the global crisis arose, this positive trend reversed and the ratio returned to the 
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124 As shown by figure 2, the CNB’s influence on the movements in overnight interest 
rates on the interbank market has only partly spilled over to interest rates on depo-
sits and loans, i.e. only to interest on long-term kuna deposits not indexed to foreign 
currency, while there has been almost no spillover to other specified interest rates. 
This partial spillover has been observed only since the end of 2005, when open-
market operations10 were introduced. Hence, the introduction of OMO had some 
positive effects on the strengthening of the interest rate channel.
The Croatian Banking Association’s analysis (2009) also points to a key problem 
of Croatia’ monetary policy, i.e. that its measures cannot simultaneously influence 
interest rates on both money and credit markets, as is the case, for example, in the 
USA, because transmission mechanisms have different effects in different coun-
tries. In small and open economies, such as Croatia, an increase in interest rates 
aimed at curbing inflation may cause excessive foreign capital inflows, domestic 
currency appreciation, growth in demand and inflation, which means that one and 
the same measure can have opposite effects in different countries. Accordingly, 
the tightening of monetary policy and increasing interest rates in a small open 
economy can cause a situation contrary to what is desired (i.e. expansion instead 
of contraction). The poor functioning of the interest rate channel is largely due to 
the foreign ownership of banks, which are able to offset the restrictive monetary 
policy by borrowing from the parent banks, which is why the credit expansion 
continued even after the outbreak of the global crisis. 
The credit channel helps forecast the movements of loans during the financial 
crisis, because their permanent availability is crucial for instigating economic ac-
tivity. It is based on the assumption that a restrictive (or an expansive) monetary 
policy may reduce (or increase) credit supply, which then affects the real sector. 
Banks always try to neutralise the restrictive monetary policy effects, which they 
often succeed in doing in Croatia, because foreign-owned banks have their parent 
banks as additional sources of finance, so that the effects of the CNB’s monetary 
policy instruments on them are limited. Nevertheless, this incomplete functioning 
of the credit channel cushioned the adverse spillover effects of the global crisis on 
Croatia, as corroborated by data on the credit growth dynamics (which did not 
slow down in the early phase of the crisis). However, it is questionable how long 
this credit growth would be sustainable and when it would result in an escalation 
of inflation. Lang and Krznar (2004) find that the impact of the monetary policy 
on banks’ credit activity is less severe if the banks are foreign-owned, because, 
instead of reducing credit supply to the same extent as domestic banks do, they 
apply to their parent banks abroad for additional sources of finance.
10 The CNB has introduced this indirect monetary policy instrument with the purpose of mitigating strong 
fluctuations in interest rates on the interbank market (prior to the introduction of OMO, this rate sometimes 
reached a high of 30%). It also facilitated public debt management, thus improving coordination between 
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125figure 3 
Primary liquidity rate and monthly growth rate of bank placemants, 1997-2011 (%)
Source: CNB.
Figure 3 shows that the classic credit channel does not work in Croatia. If it 
worked, there would be a strong correlation between the movements of the banking 
system’s primary liquidity rate and the placement growth rate. On the contrary, 
this correlation is very low. The primary liquidity rate has been stable since 2005, 
which can be associated with the introduction of open market operations, originally 
aimed at improving the system liquidity. By contrast, the fluctuations in placement 
growth rate have been much stronger. This suggests that the monetary policy ef-
fect on its movements is minor compared with that of capital inflows from abroad, 
which were heavily used by domestic banks in foreign ownership whenever the 
demand for loans exceeded the available domestic liquidity. As the crisis grew 
worse and economic activity slowed down, the credit growth rate fluctuations in-
tensified and placements even declined at some stages of the crisis. Despite the 
crisis outbreak, credit growth even accelerated in the second half of 2008, but, 
regrettably, this was mostly due to an increase in government borrowing aimed at 
redressing the budget imbalance, 
Such situations of a minor monetary policy influence on credit growth are quite 
common in developing economies and are fully in line with the research works 
arguing that there is no interest rate spillover from the money market to the depo-
sit and credit markets (Cavausoglu, 2002). Banks can conduct their credit policies 
independently of their monetary policies, as they can isolate interest rates for most 
of their credit and deposit facilities from the influence of money market interest 
rates. It is easy for banks to find substitutes for domestic sources of funds, and the 
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126 central bank has no direct influence on these substitutes, primarily the capital and 
foreign liabilities of banks (CBA’s analyses, 2009).
In a small and open economy such as Croatia, there are no monetary policy instru-
ments to either stimulate or curb credit expansion that can threaten the stability of 
prices. However, in the last few years, this expansion was strongly spurred by the 
government, in an endeavour to cover the increasingly large budget deficit. Con-
sequently, in order to improve coordination with the monetary policy, the govern-
ment must implement measures to balance the state budget and stop further growth 
of public debt.
3.2 croatian national bank and public debt management 
Given its institutional and operational independence, the central bank may not intro-
duce measures directly aimed at cutting the public debt management costs. However, 
this independence does not prevent it from taking steps towards indirectly facilitating 
public debt management. Accordingly, in April 2005, the CNB introduced OMO, 
which, despite being intended for monetary policy promotion, was able to significan-
tly improve public debt management. Specifically, by introducing OMO, the Mini-
stry of Finance’s borrowing on the domestic financial market became easier, while 
bank demand for T-bills increased (CNB, 2006). While even the announcement by 
the CNB about introducing OMO was perceived by some analysts as taking over the 
debt management function, the main purpose of the OMO is to moderate the interest 
rate fluctuations on the money market. From 1994 to 2011, interest rates on overnight 
loans fluctuated between 1% and 30%, which made it impossible to determine ben-
chmark rates on short-term and long-term sources of funds, which are crucial to the 
development and deepening of financial markets. 
figure 4
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127As shown by figure 4, until the introduction of OMO in mid-2005, interest rates 
on T-bills fluctuated considerably, but after that, they remained rather stable until 
mid-2008. Due to the crisis, liquidity on the Croatian financial market decreased, 
and interest rates on T-bills went up from mid-2008 to the second half of 2009. In 
early 2003, the government borrowed on the money market by selling T-bills at an 
interest rate of about 2.5%. However, as early as end-2003, this rate jumped to a 
high of 7%, which inevitably led to an increase in overall public debt management 
costs. The launching of OMO was accompanied by a boost in demand for T-bills, 
while fluctuations in interest rates on T-bills moderated and gradually stabilized at 
a level of about 3.85%, which resulted in a decrease in debt servicing costs11. Re-
grettably, at the first sign of the crisis in mid-2008, interest rates on T-bills started 
to grow and reached almost 8% in December. During 2009, they ranged between 
5.3% and 7.95%, while in 2010, these rates fell and stabilised again, thanks to the 
monetary policy measures implemented by the CNB.
The OMO provided a basis for more intensive government borrowing on the do-
mestic market at increasingly favourable terms. However, the CNB had to make 
sure that the monetary aggregate growth does not result in exchange rate destabi-
lisation, inflation growth and crowding other sectors out of the credit market. The-
refore it is obvious that indirect monetisation of a portion of fiscal deficit through 
the OMO does not impair the government’s obligation to significantly reduce its 
deficit, as this is the only way to provide more room for OMO. Had the govern-
ment done more to reduce the budget deficit in recent years, the CNB would have 
probably taken the decision on introducing OMO earlier (Rohatinski, 2004).
The development of OMO will further result in the gradual accumulation of a 
certain amount of government securities (only T-bills for now, but also bonds in 
the future, because in structural operations, which have not been carried out so far, 
bonds will also be accepted as collateral) in the CNB portfolio, and the central 
bank will actively manage them. All this will speed up the development of the 
government securities market.
The introduction of OMO is beneficial for the overall economy, and a sign that 
Croatia is getting closer to the EU, as these operations have been in use in most 
member states for many years. The most important thing to remember is that 
OMO is exclusively a monetary policy instrument and not a public debt manage-
ment instrument, so that the management of government securities in the CNB’s 
portfolio will exclusively be motivated by monetary reasons. By introducing 
OMO, the CNB has not assumed any significant role in public debt management, 
which remains to be the basic function and full responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance, but it has laid the basis for more effective future coordination.
11 On 14 June 2005, interest rate on T-bills with a maturity of 365 days was 5.25%, but it fell to a low of 3.85% 
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128 Over the last seven years, the CNB took the following additional measures to fa-
cilitate public debt management, without threatening its main goal, i.e. the main-
tenance of price stability:
1)  October 2004: The reserve requirement rate was reduced from 19% to 18%, 
releasing about 1.8 billion kuna of liquidity. This facilitated the realisation of 
government bond issues, by which the Ministry of Finance substituted a por-
tion of the growing external debt by domestic borrowing. The government 
used the kuna funds received from the CNB for the purchase of foreign cur-
rency intended for the repayment of Samurai bonds falling due at end-2004. 
Through this purchase, the effect of the bond issue on domestic monetary 
movements was neutralised.
2)  February 2005: The minimum coverage of foreign exchange liabilities by 
foreign exchange claims was reduced from 35% to 32%, releasing about 4 
billion kuna of liquidity, which was enough for banks to cover government 
liabilities without crowding out other economic sectors.
3)  December 2005: The reserve requirement rate was again reduced from 18% 
to 17%, releasing about 2.1 billion kuna of liquidity for the realisation of the 
Ministry of Finance’s bond issues in December 2005 and February 2006.
4)  November 2008: The reserve requirement rate was again reduced from 17% 
to 14%, releasing about 8.4 billion kuna of liquidity. This facilitated the fi-
nancing of government borrowing on the domestic market, without crowding 
out economic agents.
5)  March 2009: The CNB adopted a decision on extending eligible collateral to 
include euro-denominated T-bills, which started to be issued in larger quanti-
ties as the crisis broke out. This was another step forward in coordinating the 
monetary and public debt management policies.
6)  February 2010: The reserve requirement rate was reduced from 14% to 13%, 
releasing additional liquidity worth about 2.9 billion kuna. These funds were 
to be channelled to business subjects through the CBRD, according to the 
criteria set by the Government. It was emphasized that the CNB was ready to 
further reduce the reserve requirement rate, but only if the funds released 
were used for speeding up economic recovery.
All these measures are fully in line with the practice in advanced economies and 
with the long-term CNB policy, aimed at gradually reducing the reserve require-
ment rate. In addition to this, even in the years of the greatest external debt expan-
sion, from 22 billion euro to 39 billion euro (between 2004 and 2008), the CNB 
was taking measures to support the Government in its efforts to finance the budget 
deficit without new external borrowing. Nevertheless, the measures failed to 
achieve the desired results and, despite the CNB’s announcements of a further 
reduction in the reserve requirement rate, this has not yet been done, because most 
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129It can be concluded that the CNB measures implemented so far to facilitate public 
debt management and to substitute the fast-growing external debt by domestic 
borrowing produced only halfway results. However, this was expected, given the 
absence of coordination with other economic-policy agents.
4  the influence of the public debt management policy 
on coordination
4.1 the goals and challenges of public debt management
The main purpose of public borrowing and public debt management is to ensure 
state budget financing at the lowest medium-term and long-term costs and at an 
acceptable level of risk. An additional purpose is to develop the domestic govern-
ment securities market, because a well-developed market is a key prerequisite for 
efficient debt management. It also enables the debt portfolio diversification and 
reduces dependence on foreign sources of finance.
A great challenge facing the public debt management policy in Croatia is that its 
room for manoeuvre is very limited, preventing it from taking account of costs 
and risks of borrowing, because it is completely determined by the overall fiscal 
policy problems and growing deficit. When fiscal deficit is high, showing a further 
upward trend, it is impossible to postpone borrowing until the time when interest 
rates on domestic and world markets are low, because the government must take 
out loans as soon as possible and under any conditions offered. Thus, the govern-
ment’s borrowing on the foreign market in March 2011, worth 1.5 billion USD for 
a period of 10 years and at a rate of 6.375%, was necessary to cover the growing 
deficit, which exceeded 5 billion kuna as early as the first three months of 2011. 
Although this interest rate is lower than the rate on a number of previous govern-
ment bond issues (6.5% and 6.75%), it is still too high, so that the cost of this loan, 
earmarked for the repayment of a portion of “old”, and settlement of the current 
government liabilities, will finally reach about 2.5 billion USD (only the interest 
stands at about 970 million USD). Accordingly, the government itself would make 
the largest contribution to improving the quality of public debt management, by 
making sizeable cuts in its own spending and, consequently, in public deficit, whi-
ch would improve the country’s credit rating in the long run and ensure more fa-
vourable borrowing conditions in the future.
Croatia’s debt structure is as follows: the share of foreign currencies in total debt 
is about 70% (euro debt accounts for 57.5%) and it should not be further increa-
sed, because any stronger domestic currency depreciation would lead to sizeable 
growth in repayment costs. A good thing is that about 70% of the CNB reserves 
are in euro, because this ensures regular debt servicing even in the cases of sudden 
external shocks. The share of the fixed-interest-rate debt increased from 79.7% in 
2005 to 81.4% in 2010, and it can be said that the interest rate structure of Croa-
tia’s debt is optimal. The last few years saw a decline in the share of the long-term 
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130 term debt share increased (primarily T-bills, from 12.2% in 2005 to 16.1% in 
2010). As this enhances the risk of debt renewal, it would be good to reduce the 
share of the short-term debt. The debt maturity structure is far from being ideal, 
so, according to debt repayment projections for the period 2011-20, the burden of 
repayment is heavier in the first half and at the end of the period. For efficient 
public debt management it is important that the burden of repayment is spread 
equally over a future period, and special attention should be paid to debt maturity 
smoothing, as envisaged in the new Strategy.
The most commonly used public debt management instruments were bonds (their 
share in total debt fell from 70% to about 60% in the 2000-10 period) and credits 
(their share rose from 25% to about 26% of total debt in the same period). T-bills 
gained in importance with the introduction of OMO in 2005, and stood at about 
13% of total debt in 2010. The last ten years also saw an increase in domestic debt, 
its share in total debt going up from 36% in 2000 to 67.6% in 2010. This was due 
to an increasing orientation to the domestic market, caused by the rapid external 
debt growth over that period. However, excessive government borrowing on the 
domestic market deeply affects the financial system liquidity, crowding out other 
sectors, and therefore its further growth should be prevented.
figure 5
Structure of public debt by instruments, 2000-10 (in billion kuna)
1 Including Croatian Motorways. 
2 Excluding Croatian Motorways.
Source: CNB.
As shown by figure 5, for the purpose of coordination with the monetary policy, a 
large portion of government borrowing on the international markets was substitu-
ted by domestic borrowing in the period 2005-08, as the excessive external debt 
 Bonds   Credits   T-bills + money market instruments
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131growth compromised the credibility of the country and produced strong apprecia-
tion pressures on the kuna exchange rate. Therefore, the CNB urged the govern-
ment to cut its portion of external debt, which the government did, so that the total 
public debt movements remained very stable over that period. However, since the 
end of 2008, the government has increased both public debt components, and 
coordination with the monetary policy has deteriorated ever since.
Croatia still lacks some of the instruments extensively used in EU member states, 
which have been recommended in the literature as the most acceptable for good 
coordination between the monetary and public debt management policies. In si-
tuations that call for a more restrictive anti-inflationary monetary policy of the 
central bank, the government should issue inflation-linked bonds, which would 
improve the credibility of both monetary and fiscal policies and encourage invest-
ments in such instruments. This would ease the pressure on the central bank to 
tolerate higher inflation in order to reduce the real value of public debt12. The in-
dexed debt market has been on the increase in the EU, because it allows the issuers 
to prove their credibility, and enables investors who invest in such debt to diversify 
their portfolio and protect themselves from inflation. However, the share of in-
dexed debt in total debt should not be too large, because this would have disa-
strous consequences in the case of unexpected economic shocks. Croatia still does 
not apply inflation-indexed bonds, although they would ensure much lower inte-
rest rates, which would not involve inflationary expectations.
It remains to be hoped that the difficulties in public debt management will soon be 
resolved, and that the debt management policy will then be much more efficient 
and better coordinated with the monetary policy.
4.2 the ministry of finance’ contribution to coordination
The Ministry of Finance improved coordination by reducing the government’s 
external borrowing in the period 2005-2008. The CNB constantly called for 
slowing down the huge external debt growth, as it has reached a level threatening 
the country’s credibility, increasing the appreciation pressures on the kuna and 
hampering the monetary policy implementation. In response to these calls, the 
government reduced its share in external debt from about 30% at end-2004 to 
about 11% at end-2008. It became increasingly oriented to the domestic market, 
but as the crisis broke out and the domestic market conditions deteriorated, and as 
there was a risk of crowding out other sectors, the government returned to bor-
rowing abroad in 2009. 
By adopting a Strategy for the Development and Modernization of the State Trea-
sury, 2007-2011, the Ministry of Finance intended to rationalise the state budget 
liquidity management and make significant savings in public debt management. 
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132 This would enable the CNB to manage the financial system liquidity in a more 
efficient way. Regrettably, no major savings were realised.
The largest contribution by the Ministry of Finance to better coordination between 
the monetary and public debt management policies would be the achieving of the 
following goals set in the new Public Debt Management Strategy, 2011-2013:
–  stabilising the public debt-to-GDP ratio, which would increase the credibi-
lity of the overall national economic policy, encourage investments, and ena-
ble the CNB to release additional liquidity to finance business projects without 
boosting inflation. 
–  extending the average maturity and reducing the short-term debt-to- 
total debt ratio, which would mitigate the risk of debt renewal and of severe 
liquidity disruptions in the system. In order to reduce the share of short-term 
debt and extend the average maturity, government borrowing over the next 
medium-term will be focused on instruments with longer maturities, primarily 
bonds with maturities of 5 to 10 years. The maturities of new debts will be 
adjusted in order to smooth the maturity dynamics of liabilities and equitably 
distribute the burden of refinancing.
–  Introducing currency risk hedging mechanisms. Renewed growth in go-
vernment borrowing enhances the currency risk, which can be only partially 
mitigated by systematic promotion and development of a domestic currency 
yield curve, and largely eliminated only by joining the EU. The Public Debt 
Management Strategy envisages reducing the currency risk over the next three 
years, by introducing risk hedging instruments (“currency swap”) and by su-
bstituting the majority of the USD-denominated debt by debt in euro. 
–  continually promoting and developing the domestic securities market. 
The development of this market would accelerate the achievement of the pu-
blic debt management and monetary policy goals, by increasing the transpa-
rency and predictability of the public debt management policy, and, conse-
quently, facilitating the implementation of the monetary policy as well. The-
refore, the securities market development is a joint objective of both public 
debt management and monetary policies and one of the main prerequisites for 
their effective coordination. In Croatia, the CNB currently uses T-bills, and 
will perhaps use the Ministry of Finance’s bonds in future, as collateral in 
OMO and Lombard loan transactions, and is therefore interested in a further 
development and deepening of the government securities market.
Another move forward in public debt management is also the release of a T-bill 
auction calendar in 2011, which will contribute to the transparency and predicta-
bility of the policy, as an important prerequisite for good coordination with the 
monetary policy.
5 an assessment of coordination so far
The institutions responsible for public debt management, monetary and fiscal po-
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133dent policy implementation by each of them brings benefits to the entire economy, 
because it enables reducing risk premiums in the long-term interest rate structure. 
However, there is also a possibility of conflicts between these policies, particularly 
between the public debt management and the monetary policy. Specifically, as the 
monetary policy is aimed at maintaining price stability and the public debt mana-
gement policy at providing the necessary funding to the government at minimal 
costs, there is a strong possibility of a conflict between the two policies.
What are the most frequent causes of conflicts and can they be avoided through 
more effective coordination? 
–  the interest rate level. In a situation of huge monetary aggregate growth, 
central banks, in order to prevent inflation, often apply restrictive measures to 
influence the interest rate growth. This may be contrary to the fiscal authori-
ties’ intentions to borrow on the domestic market at as favourable terms as 
possible.
–  Growth in public borrowing on the financial market. Central banks often 
warn the government about the monetary effects produced by its borrowing. 
The sale of large amounts of government securities can severely distort the 
banking system liquidity and thus impair the efficiency of the monetary policy. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the central bank receives timely information about 
the borrowing plans and that it takes prompt action towards maintaining price 
stability.
The resolution of conflicts should be based on the experiences of developed coun-
tries paying close attention to coordination between the monetary and public debt 
management policies. In Great Britain, the central bank provides counselling to 
the Treasury and conducts market transactions with government securities on its 
behalf. In Ireland, there is a top-level working group, meeting regularly in order 
to improve coordination between the monetary and public debt management poli-
cies. Sweden’s Debt Management Office is legally bound to negotiate about the 
monetary policy with the central bank; it consists of two coordination committees: 
one for domestic and the other for external debt (Crona, 1997). Despite the highly 
developed financial markets in these countries, and the fact that coordination is 
mainly achieved through the implementation of market instruments, there is still 
need for coordination between these important policies.
If all the prerequisites for effective coordination were met, the harmonisation of 
these policies could be easily achieved. In such case, the financial market would 
function as a well-organised mechanism, sending timely and clear signals to deci-
sion-makers and facilitating coordination between their policies, thus making for-
mal coordination far less important. However, as such ideal conditions can hardly 
be achieved, appropriate arrangements must be made for coordinating the public 
debt management and monetary policies. In Croatia, for example, where the pre-
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134 regulations on coordination, which are laid down in the Act on the CNB (Zakon o 
Hrvatskoj narodnoj banci, NN 75/08)13. In this country, not enough attention is 
given to coordination between the public debt management and monetary poli-
cies. Coordination between the objectives, instruments and institutional and ope-
rational arrangements of the monetary, fiscal and public debt management policies 
is crucial not only for avoiding possible conflicts of jurisdiction, but also because 
a joint action, exchange of information and technical cooperation can accelerate 
the market development process, widen the room for manoeuvre for both fiscal 
and monetary policies, encourage saving and, as result of all this, preserve the 
country’s macroeconomic stability (Babić et al., 2001).
Over the last ten years, coordination between the monetary and debt management 
policies went through different stages of “ups and downs”:
–  In the period 2004-08, the CNB and the Ministry of Finance successfully 
coordinated the government’s external debt servicing. 
–  Although the Act on the CNB prohibits direct government borrowing from the 
CNB, it opened up a possibility to conduct OMO. Accordingly, the launching 
of OMO in 2005, created additional opportunities for government borrowing 
on the domestic market and improved coordination in the money market.
–  From 2005 to the outbreak of the crisis, accompanied by increasing fiscal 
imbalances, the Ministry of Finance continuously reduced the government’s 
share in external debt.
– A sound Debt Management Strategy for the period 2011-13 was adopted.
–  Despite the existence of a CNB-Ministry of Finance Cooperation Commission 
and the regulations of the Act on the CNB, obliging the Ministry to regularly 
inform the CNB of all government budget transactions and operations related 
to public debt, the cooperation between the two authorities is still inadequate. 
The Ministry of Finance should regularly report to the CNB on all current and 
future government needs and on the problems related to debt sustainability.
–  The issuance of kuna bonds, which always affects the financial system liqui-
dity, is inadequately coordinated.
–  A lack of operational coherence between the monetary and fiscal policies has 
been a serious problem both before and after the outbreak of the crisis.
–  The Economic Recovery Programme from April 2010, seemed to be an im-
portant move forward, as it announced structural reforms and fiscal adjust-
ments, which, once implemented, would enable the CNB to continue reducing 
the reserve requirement rate and thus provide additional liquidity to fuel eco-
nomic growth. However, as the Programme objectives have not been realised, 
the reserve requirement rate remains unchanged.
In short, despite some progress made in the period 2004-08, coordination between 
the monetary and public debt management policies was inadequate during the last 
ten years, and especially during the last two recession years. Given differences in 
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135the primary objectives and functions between the Ministry of Finance and the 
CNB, it is sometimes impossible to avoid conflicts, although many of them could 
be avoided through better coordination.
5.1 barriers to effective coordination
The major barriers to effective coordination are the following:
–  The absence of mechanisms for closer coordination in the periods of financial 
crisis, which have been used in some countries to accelerate the exit from the 
crisis.
–  Still inadequate transparency of the fiscal policy. Despite the Public Debt Ma-
nagement Strategy for the period 2011-13, the Ministry of Finance does not 
submit information on government revenue and expenditure and plans of bor-
rowing to the CNB in a timely manner, which has a serious impact on the fi-
nancial system liquidity forecasting.
–  The strong upward trend in public debt, with no indication of any austerity 
measures in the public sector, aimed at reversing this trend, which narrows the 
monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre.
–  The underdeveloped financial market, especially the government securities 
market. In order to stimulate the market growth, the CNB and the Ministry of 
Finance should jointly provide incentives to introducing primary dealers in 
government securities, which proved to be a very good solution in many coun-
tries.
–  Failure to accomplish the goals set out in the Economic Recovery Programme. 
The accomplishment of these goals, especially the one relating to fiscal con-
solidation, would significantly improve coordination between the monetary 
and public debt management policies.
Although the above mentioned barriers cannot be fully removed in the short run, 
there is still a possibility to jointly define long-term goals and tasks, as well as an 
optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix that would become even more important 
in the light of Croatia’s upcoming accession to the EU, and the new environment 
it will have to cope with.
6 conclusion and recommendations
Despite some progress made in coordinating the monetary and public debt mana-
gement policies, this coordination has been inadequate, which has, to some extent, 
destabilised the current macroeconomic situation in Croatia. These two crucial 
policies had been fully separated before the basic prerequisites for such separation 
were met. Specifically, even though the separation of the monetary policy from 
the public debt management policy is a desirable process it has to be accompanied 
by creating conditions for effective coordination, i.e. transparent public debt ma-
nagement and a well-developed government securities market. Unlike these two 
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136 In the period 2004-08, some improvements were made in coordination, particularly 
by introducing open market operations and reducing the government’s share in 
total external debt. During the recession years 2009-10, coordination was rather 
poor, although it was in that period that it should have been at its highest level. 
Formal regulations on coordination exist, but are not fully implemented. The Mi-
nistry of Finance and the CNB should therefore intensify their efforts in this res-
pect.
Despite the narrowing room for manoeuvre, the CNB has continuously contribu-
ted to improved coordination. However, due to the poor functioning of the credit 
and interest rate channels of monetary transmission, the CNB has been unable to 
adequately influence the banks’ credit activity or rates of interest on bank credits 
and deposits, but it has influenced the money market interest rates. Hence, these 
issues also require coordination with other economic policy agents, including the 
public debt management policy. Perhaps some CNB measures should have been 
introduced earlier (e.g. reducing the reserve requirement rate), which might have 
slowed the economic downturn and softened the negative effect of that downturn 
on the fiscal and public debt management policies, but this is hard to estimate. 
Despite some contribution to coordination improvement made by the Ministry of 
Finance, especially through the introduction of the new Debt Management Stra-
tegy for 2011-2013, the Ministry and the Government have failed to implement 
the planned structural changes and fiscal adjustments, and to promptly inform the 
CNB of their respective activities relevant for the operational coherence between 
the fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, a regular exchange of information 
between the Ministry of Finance and the CNB, with a view to coordinating fiscal 
and monetary policies should be established as soon as possible.
Both the CNB and the Ministry of Finance should promote the government secu-
rities market development. The CNB has already taken some steps down this rou-
te by launching OMO, and the Ministry of Finance has given this objective a 
prominent place in its Public Debt Management Strategy (2011-2013). Introdu-
cing OMO in April 2005 was a significant move towards developing the short-
term government securities market, as the demand for government securities in-
creased and interest rates were lower and less volatile in the period 2005-08. Even 
the accomplishment of the goals set in the Public Debt Management Strategy 
would be a major step forward in improving coordination.
The Ministry of Finance and the CNB are faced with many tasks and challenges. 
Dealing with them in a proper way may, in a few years time, result in considerable 
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